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THE EIGHTH ANNUAL
HONORABLE HELEN WILSON NIES
MEMORIAL LECTURE
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
DO WE HAVE TOO MANY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?*
HON. RICHARD A. POSNER**

INTRODUCTION'

Good afternoon and welcome to the Annual Nies Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law. This year we are particularly honored to
have as our guest speaker Judge Richard Posner, one of the most
distinguished figures and best-known legal scholars in our country and
abroad. After his graduation from Harvard Law School, Judge Posner
worked for several years in Washington D.C., as a clerk to Justice
Brennan, as an assistant to Commissioner Elman of the Federal Trade
Commission, as an assistant to Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,
and as general counsel to President Johnson's Task Force on
Communication Policy. Judge Posner began his academic career at
Stanford in 1968. One year later, he moved to the University of Chicago
where he taught as full time faculty until 1981, when he was appointed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and where he still
teaches as a Senior Lecturer in Law. As one of the best-known figures
in law and economics, Judge Posner has contributed to all areas of law
throughout his career: jurisprudence, law and literature, constitutional
interpretation, criminal law, labor law, and of course intellectual
* Audiotape of the Eighth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law, held at Marquette University Law School (March 28, 2005) (on file
with the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review). The lecture is delivered each spring
semester by a nationally recognized scholar in the field of intellectual property law.
** Richard A. Posner is a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a
Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
1. Professor Irene Calboli, Marquette University Law School, provided introductory
remarks.
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property. Judge Posner has written more than thirty-eight books, and
more than three hundred law review articles and book reviews. Please
join me in warmly thanking Judge Posner for coming to Marquette
University Law School today.
LECTURE

Thank you very much Professor Calboli and Dean Kearney. It is a
pleasure to be here and an honor to be asked to give this Nies lecture.
I'll try not to speak for too long, and thus leave time for questions.
What I'm going to talk about is the phenomenon of "propertization"
(of intellectual property), that is, taking some valuable resource, in this
case an intellectual resource broadly understood, and making it a
private property. When I say by way of title, "Do We Have Too Many
Intellectual Property Rights?" this should be understood to mean "Are
we over-propertizing intellectual property?" I think there is a danger of
that, and that is what I want to focus on, with particular reference to
copyrights and patents. Though copyrights and patents are not the only
forms of intellectual property, they are probably the most important and
I will focus on them, indeed with a somewhat greater emphasis on
copyrights than patents.
I think it is very useful when thinking about intellectual property to
start with physical property-indeed I think professors who teach the
law of physical property should also teach intellectual property, and vice
versa, because the continuity between these two forms of property are
important and striking; but the differences are also illuminating. One
error that the courts and Congress can fall into is moving too quickly
from the principles of physical property to those of intellectual property.
For when we think of intellectual property and the model of physical
property we are struck by three differences. First, intellectual property
rights tend to be limited in duration-twenty years for most patent
rights and life plus seventy years for copyrights owned by individuals.
There are forms of intellectual property-or maybe quasi-intellectual
property-that do not have durational limitations; I'll just mention them
very quickly. One of them is trademarks. I realize that Professor
Calboli is a specialist in trademark law but actually I do not regard
trademarks as intellectual property. They are identifiers. They are
compact ways of identifying the source of a product and they do not
create any right beyond the right to have an unambiguous identifier of
your goods so that consumers are not confused. Another exception to
the durational limitation of intellectual property is trade secrets, but
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trade secrets are intellectual property in only a special sense, because in
the main trade secret law only allows you to enforce tort law and
contract law against efforts to appropriate some secret process or
method that you have. As long as copiers and imitators avoid violating
tort law or contract law, they can take your secret: for example by
There are other forms of
reverse engineering, with impunity.
intellectual property also, but I do not have time to discuss them. An
important one is the right of publicity-that is, the right of a celebrity to
have the exclusive commercial use of his or her name. There is also a
doctrine of misappropriation, which allows some limited protection for
ideas that are not patentable or copyrightable.
But if one limits one's attention to copyrights and patents as the
most important intellectual property rights, then it is correct and
important that they have a time limitation. There are also significant
scope limitations in intellectual property rights. You cannot copyright
every form of expression, every piece of art, every musical work, and so
on. What are called "ideas" are excluded from copyright protection.
They usually are not ideas in the scientific sense; they are mainly stock
characters, familiar plots, and so on. They may be very important
dimensions of a very creative work, but they are not copyrightable. In
the case of patents, fundamental ideas-basic research-are not
patentable. So there are, durational limitations and scope limitation and
also the concept of fair use, particularly in copyright, but also, though
usually not called by that name, in patents. Fair use allows some
appropriation of intellectual property without the permission of the
owner-unlicensed copying that is nevertheless lawful.
In these three respects intellectual property is really quite different
from physical property. In physical property, we don't have durational
limitations. You own your house, your wristwatch, your clothing, and so
on, in perpetuity. There is no real scope limitation. There is very little
in the way of physical property that cannot be owned. Some things
cannot be owned, for example illegal products; but generally we do not
think that there are important areas of physical property that are out of
bounds. Nor have we a robust concept of fair use of physical property.
You cannot get into your neighbor's car, drive it around the block,
return it to the neighbor, and say, "Well, I know I didn't have your
permission to take this joy ride, but it was a short ride. It didn't
interfere significantly with your use of your property." The only real
exception I can think of to the absence of a fair use doctrine in the law
physical property is what is called a "trespass by necessity." If, for
example, you veered off the road in order to avoid hitting a child, and
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veered onto the adjacent private property, that trespass would be
considered justified. That would be an example of an appropriation,
obviously very limited, of private property without permission or
compensation, which nevertheless would be privileged.
The effect of these three limitations on intellectual property that do
not have significant counterparts in physical property is that there is a
significant public domain of intellectual property, that is, a significant
area of unappropriated and unappropriatable property-a mass of
valuable ideas and expressions that are available for anybody to borrow,
copy, use, freely but not exclusively. We do have a public domain in
physical property; we have public lands, but they are public domain in a
special sense, the sense of being owned by the government rather than
individuals or private firms. Still it is owned, and treated as property.
The government decides whether you will be permitted on its public
lands; it charges fees for access, for example to national parks. The
government may have different pricing policies but, basically,
government-owned property is administered and regulated like, and
subject to similar legal regimes as, privately owned property. There is
relatively little physical property that people are permitted to use but
not allowed to establish a property right in.
The big difference then between physical and intellectual property is
that the law insists that there be a large public domain of intellectual
property. Why is this? The way to approach the answer is to ask: Why
is it that we have private ownership of physical property? What are the
benefits of such a regime? Why do we not have a big public domain in
physical property? Why do we not communalize property?
There are two answers to this series of questions that I find
persuasive. The first is the desirability of limiting congestion. If you
think about how people use highways, and contrast a toll-way with an
unlimited access highway, although everybody is sensitive to the delays
on a congested highway and nobody likes it, when you decide whether
to drive to work rather than take the train all you care about, if you are
a normally self-interested person, is the delay you will experience; you
do not worry about the delay your use of the highway will impose on the
other drivers. It is because of unlimited access to a physical facility, like
a highway, that people do not consider the effect of their own behavior
on the convenience of the other users, producing a congestion problem.
But if you have a toll road-that is, if someone owns the highway and
treats it as property-the owner will fix the toll at a level that will bring
about an optimal degree of congestion. Optimal in the sense that on the
one hand you do not want to have so little use of the highway that
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everybody speeds along with no delay and there are very few users, but
on the other hand you do not want everybody crawling because there is
so much use. So you fix a toll, which you can vary by the time of the
day, and so on, that will optimize congestion. That is an advantage of
private property.
The other advantage, which is probably the one that is most familiar,
is that with private property, people have an incentive to invest in
developing the property-to make it as valuable as it can be madebecause they get to enjoy the benefits of that investment. They reap
where they have sown. If you had a situation in which anyone was free
to come along and harvest the crops that you had planted, you would
not have any incentive to plant. If we want people to invest for the
future, to we have to give them property rights.
The implication of this analysis is that everything should be owned.
If everything is owned by someone, then we get the optimal degree of
congestion and we get the optimal investment in creating future values.
The question is; why does this reasoning not apply equally to intellectual
property? Why should we place limitations on ownership in an effort to
create a public domain? One reason has to do with costs of transacting.
In a dynamic society the first owner of a piece of property is not
necessarily the last. Values change, people change, and so on, and it
may turn out that the property is more valuable in a different use. That
is extremely common. So we need a system of transfers, sales, or in
short transactions, in order to make sure that property can gravitate to
its most valuable use. In the case of physical property that is ordinarily
unproblematic. We know who owns a particular property; we see the
property, it is visible, and it is also recorded in public registries.
Knowing what the property is and who owns it, one can
straightforwardly transact with the owner and thus shift the property
into a more valuable use. In the case of intellectual property, the
process of transacting and thus shifting the property into more valuable
uses is much more complicated, and there are various reasons for that.
One is simply the invisibility of intellectual property. You cannot
see an idea, and if you do not have a clear sense of what the property is
it is very difficult to transact in it. Intellectual property is indefinite in
time as well as in space. We do not have the same detailed registry of
ideas and works of expression that we have in the case of physical
property, with its Uniform Commercial Code registries of chattels and
its land-title registries for real property. True, whenever a new work is
created and copyright is sought, with some exceptions, the work is
deposited in the Library of Congress; but there is no way to search the
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Library of Congress to find out whether some particular expression that
you would like to use has been used in the past. With patents, there is,
of course, the patent recording system, and in principle one can search
the files of the patent office to find out whether your invention has been
anticipated, but this is often extremely difficult to do. In the case of
software, for example it is very difficult for Patent and Trademark
Office to index software so that someone who has invented a piece of
software can find out whether he has been anticipated. So transacting is
difficult in the case of intellectual property and the more difficult
transacting is the more society might want to bypass the property rights
system and allow someone to use a piece of property without
transacting. I will give some illustrations in a moment.
A second reason that we don't want to have universal propertization
of intellectual property as of physical property is that there is a greater
monopoly potential for intellectual property, precisely because there are
no spatial limits on a piece of such property. We don't worry terribly
about someone monopolizing the manufacture wheels. Wheels are easy
to build and there are many potential manufacturers; but on the other
hand the idea of the wheel must have been invented by someone, many
thousands of years ago (maybe a number of someones at more or less
the same time), and if the idea of the wheel could be property there
would be an enormous monopoly potential. This links up with the
previous point about transaction costs because the more people that
have to obtain a license in order to use an idea the greater the total costs
of transacting. If everybody who wants to manufacture a wheel had to
get a license from the patentee of the idea, the aggregate transaction
costs would be enormous.
A third reason is the public-good aspect of intellectual property.
This requires just a word of explanation. When the economists talk
about a "public good" they do not mean something owned by the
government; they mean something that more than one person can use at
the same time without reducing the value of the product to the other
users. If I have a hammock, for example, a physical good, you cannot
have a hundred people lying in the hammock with me. The hammock is
thus a private good in the economic sense, and this would be true even if
it were owned by the government. But while multiple uses impose costs
in the case of physical property, this is not true in the case of intellectual
property. A hundred people, or for that matter a million people, can be
reading the same book at the same time. They are not occupying the
same physical space, however.
They are consuming the same
intellectual property without reducing the value of that property to

2005]

TOO MANY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?

anybody else. This makes the meaning of theft-or piracy-very
different in the intellectual property than in the physical property
domain. This is a point that owners of intellectual property have
successfully concealed by managing to appropriate the term "piracy,"
which of course has very negative connotations, to describe
unauthorized copying, even though there is a huge difference between
copying someone's intellectual property and taking someone's physical
property.
To illustrate, computer operating systems are widely copied without
the authorization of the owner and without any compensation to him.
That is described as "piracy," it is copyright infringement, and it can be
patent infringement as well because software is patentable as well as
copyrightable. But actually suppose that people who copy an operating
system are mainly people who could not afford to, and would not, buy
the operating system from the producer-maybe they live in the third
world. That means that the producer is not actually losing any sales as a
result of this unauthorized copying.
That is very different from the situation where someone goes into a
Rolls Royce showroom and steals a Rolls Royce. The fact that he could
not afford to pay for it does not mean that he is not inflicting harm on
the company; he is, because the property that he is taking is unavailable
to be sold to someone else. But however many people copy an
operating system, that doesn't restrict the output of the producer of the
operating system, except insofar as the people who do the copying
actually could and would pay the producer's price if they could not copy.
If only a few of the people who copied the program would have bought
it, the producer actually benefits from the piracy because the more
people who use the operating system the greater the market for
applications programs that work with it, and he may produce such
programs as well as the operating system.
This is not to say that rampant copying of copyrighted work cannot
hurt copyright owners; of course it can. It depends on how much
copying there is, who is doing the copying, how good the copies are, and
so on. That is why we have this file-sharing controversy about to be
argued in the Supreme Court; with very cheap, acoustically adequate,
and rapid copying of popular music CDs the manufacturers of the CDs
may be losing a substantial income. Infringement is something to think
about, but it should not be equated to theft because of the difference
between a public good and a private good.
A fourth difference between physical and intellectual property is
that we assume in the case of physical property that if there are no
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property rights very little of this property will actually be produced. It is
costly: If you cannot charge for a house, who is going to build it? If you
cannot charge for a wristwatch, who is going to incur the expense of
making a wristwatch? Yet in the case of intellectual property we know
that a great deal of intellectual property is produced even when there
are no property rights in intellectual property at all. We know this
because copyrights and patents came late in the history of the human
race. They are relatively recent innovations, medieval or late medieval
in the case of patents and eighteenth century in the case of copyrights in
England. Before these legal regimes there was enormous production of
intellectual property. Even today there are many ways in which people
are induced to produce intellectual property without propertization.
Professors write articles. The articles are copyrighted but the authors do
not receive royalties or other fees. What we have in the academy is a
patronage system: The professors are paid a salary to teach and to write,
and thus part of their salary is really compensation for writing as in the
old patronage systems where an author would have a patron who
admired him and would pay him to write. Popular singers are
concerned about file sharing. Yet before there were CDs-indeed,
before there were recordings of any sort-there was popular music.
People were creating it in great quantity and we know that an important
source of income for singers and composers is live performances, which
are not affected by file sharing.
A great deal of creative expression is "incentivized" by the nonpecuniary benefits that accrue to the creators, the satisfaction they get
from creating. Van Gogh sold no paintings during his lifetime-not a
happy person, he killed himself-but nevertheless he was driven to
create non-marketable works by an inner pressure.
In short, propertization doesn't really have the same significance in
intellectual property that it has in physical property. It has an important
role to play, but not as important, and this helps to explain why there
are limits to propertization of intellectual property and why we should
be careful about erasing those limits.
There is a further, very important reason for distinguishing between
the intellectual and the physical public domain. Ordinarily in the case of
physical property we do not think of physical property being, so to
speak, built on top of other physical property. You do not say, "I like
your house. I'd like to build my house on top of your house." That
does not make a lot of sense. However, most intellectual property
builds upon intellectual property. Most of it is incremental. There are
loads of illustrations. One is West Side Story, the Leonard Bernstein
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musical; which came from Pyramus and Thisbe, a story by Ovid, via
Romeo and Juliet. So this is incremental creation, building on what has
gone before. If that is how intellectual property is characteristically
created, you can see the importance of the public domain. If there is no
public domain, then every creator of intellectual property is going to
have to obtain multiple copyright licenses-but from whom? Look
around for Ovid's descendants, to try to negotiate a license, if he has any
descendants;" or did his rights escheat to the Roman Empire? What is
the successor to the Roman Empire?
Let me illustrate the problems of excessive propertization of
intellectual property by reference to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act.' That was the statute upheld against constitutional
challenge in the Eldred case.3 The Act increased the length of the
standard copyright term from the life of the author or other creator plus
fifty years to life plus seventy years, so it tacked on twenty years to all
unexpired copyrights, not only on works that had not been created yet
but on all existing works as well. The result was a significant
constriction of the public domain.
It is a statute with an absurd history. It became a sentimental
favorite because Sonny Bono-who was killed in a skiing accident-was
reported to have said that: "copyright should be forever." If copyright
should be forever, well, just adding twenty years is not an issue. The
real pressure for the extension came initially from the descendantsrelatives, heirs, and so on-of George and Ira Gershwin and other very
successful composers/writers of popular music in the twenties and
thirties, whose copyrights were about to expire, and later from the Walt
Disney Corporation, which was facing the imminent expiration of the
Mickey Mouse copyright. So there was a lot of pressure behind the law,
and it was passed.
I note in this connection a distortion in the political process. There
is an asymmetry of interests whenever the choice is between
propertization of intellectual property and maintenance of the public
domain. The valuable intellectual goods that are protected by property
rights, by copyrights or patents, generate large earnings for their owners,
but goods that are in the public domain do not generate large earnings
because they are freely copiable, driving the earnings on them down to
the competitive level. Publishers of public domain works, not being able
to copyright their works, tend to be rather thread-bare entrepreneurs;
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-06 (1998).
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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lacking large profits, they can't lobby as effectively against an extension
of copyright or patent terms, and the resulting shrinkage in the public
domain, as the owners of such intellectual property rights can lobby for
extensions.
In the patent area, we see this in the asymmetry of investments in
lobbying and litigation of the manufacturers of branded-that is,
patented-pharmaceutical products and the manufacturers of the
generics, because the price and profit difference between a patented
drug and its generic equivalent are enormous. After a drug becomes
generic there is actually an interval in which the first generic
manufacturer has some protection against competition from other
generic manufacturers, but putting that aside the price of the generic
will tend to be bid down to the manufacturing cost, not yielding any
abnormal profits for the generic manufacturer; whereas before the
patent expires the ratio of the price of the pharmaceutical to actual cost
to the manufacturer may be very high. That's not a complete analysis
because the pharmaceutical companies have large R&D and marketing
expenses, but nevertheless when a drug patent is about to expire the
potential cost to the patentee greatly exceeds the potential gains to the
generics.
In any event, one of the problems created by the Eldred decision,
upholding the Sonny Bono Act, was that the longer the copyright term
is, the higher the cost of transacting with the original owner. Publishers
who would like to publish public domain works and not have to deal
with copyright owners, if they find themselves forced to do so because
the public domain has shrunk and the works they were planning to
publish in a year or two when the copyright expired are going to remain
under copyright, will have to hunt up the copyright owner and negotiate
with him. The older the copyright, the more difficult it is to find the
copyright owner. You can look in a book and you'll see the name of the
original copyright owner, but the book will not tell you, and there will
be no easy way to find out, whether the copyright has been transferred,
who the current owner is, and so on. If you do track down this person,
you may find yourself in a difficult negotiation. It is one thing to have a
regular market in stocks, real estate, personal property, and so forth in
which one can transact with some confidence, but if someone
unexpectedly shows up on your doorstep and says "You know, I've
discovered that your great-grandfather wrote a book, it's been out of
print for fifty years, but I think, there might be a market and I'd like to
publish it," what kind of negotiation is going to ensue? The person you
have approached will not have any idea what a proper license fee is for
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such a work, so transaction costs, already great in intellectual property
as I have said, become greater the longer the copyright term.
Remember that one reason there is a durational limitation on copyright
is high transaction costs: The longer the duration, the greater those
costs.

One way around this problem is to enlarge the boundaries of the fair
use doctrine as currently understood, in recognition that the increase in
the copyright term has increased transaction costs and so requires an
adjustment, which would nevertheless be consistent with the spirit of the
Sonny Bono Act. In the name of fair use the law should say to people
who want to publish what they hoped would soon be in the public
domain but turns out by virtue of the Act to be still under copyright, "If
you make a reasonable search for the copyright owner, and you can't
find him, you can go ahead and publish the work without permission
and without having to compensate the copyright owner. The work will
be deemed to have entered the public domain." And to the copyright
owners the law would say, "If you want to protect your copyright, you
should make sure that it is registered somewhere so that people who
want to publish any work that you own will be able to search in the
registry and discover your name and address." If that were the rule, we
would see private registries spring up in which people who had
copyrights would register them and thus maintain their rights.
The reason this approach would be quite consistent with the
extension of the copyright term by the Sonny Bono Act is that the
purpose of the Act was to protect valuable copyrights. Very few old
copyrights are valuable. We know that because in the old days, before
the copyright term was measured from the life of the creator of the
work, if you wanted to keep your copyright beyond its initial term, you
had to pay a renewal fee. The fee was exceedingly modest, yet the vast
majority of copyrights were not renewed. Most copyrights lose their
value very rapidly. So there would be no great loss to anybody if we
made it somewhat easier for publishers to publish old though still
copyrighted works without the permission of the owner. The owners of
those copyrights that are valuable-copyrights that would have been
renewed under the old regime-will have every incentive to register
their copyrights in order to be protected against the fair use doctrine.
I have somewhat slighted the patent area, so in closing let me
address briefly a counterpart problem in patent to the copyright
problem I have been discussing. In copyright, because of the Sonny
Bono Act and other developments as well, there is a kind of congestion
of copyrights. That is, there are a lot of old copyrights that are not
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really worth much, but if you have to negotiate with the copyright
owners it creates difficulties for current publishers because the public
domain has shrunk. There has been a similar development in patents.
In the late 1970s it was feared that the American economy was falling
behind the economies of Europe and Japan because of insufficient
technological innovation. That fear was almost certainly wrong, but it
was widespread and one consequence was the creation in the early 1980s
of a new court-the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It is
actually the successor to the Court of Claims, but it was given something
new, a monopoly of patent appeals. It would be, subject only to
Supreme Court review, the authoritative interpreter of the patent laws.
Partly because of the concern at the time with what was believed to
be insufficient American scientific technological innovation, and partly
because a court that has a monopoly on a particular law is likely to see
itself as promoter of that law, the Federal Circuit from the beginning
became much more friendly to patent claims than had been true when
the regional federal courts of appeals decided patent appeals. Patents
were much more likely to be upheld against challenges of validity in the
years following the creation of the Federal Circuit, and that continues
right up to the present. As a result, because patents are more likely to
be held valid, there has been a very great increase in the number of
patents granted.
One particularly important development in the Federal Circuit was
the recognition of a class of patents called "business method patents,"
which are not technology, but instead are ideas for better ways of doing
business. In the old days, such ideas would have been thought nonpatentable, would have been considered the kind of normal business
innovation that is driven by incentives that did not depend on
propertization. A number of what would have in the olden days been
thought dubious improvements in business method have been granted
patents and those patents have been upheld, with the result that when a
firm now contemplates making a new product or adopting a new
method of doing business, it confronts a much larger array of existing
patents than in the old days-a veritable thicket of patents. What this
means is that firms incur additional expenses in negotiating for patent
licenses. Some companies have realized that a company's patent
portfolio can be an independent source of profit, even if the company
doesn't manufacture anything.
A striking feature of the patent system is that you can obtain a
patent simply on the basis of a drawing and a set of specifications. You
do not have to have made the product or the process that you are
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seeking the patent for; you don't even need to have made a prototype.
You do have to satisfy the Patent Office that your drawing, your
blueprint, could be used to make a real thing, but you don't have to have
made it. You can have imaginative people grinding out patent
applications at a great rate, the company obtains the patents, and now it
looks around and when it seems someone with a new product related to
the subject of its patent it writes a letter to the producer saying, "Oh, by
the way, we have noticed you are planning to make this or that, and you
are actually infringing our patent but we don't like litigation and so for a
modest fee we'll license our patent to you." This kind of business
strategy creates impediments to inventions. Instead of stimulating
invention, the lax standard of the patent office may be creating
incentives for strategic uses of intellectual property that end up making
invention more costly, more burdensome, thus reducing the rate and
distorting the direction of incentive activity. It is another example of
how increasing propertization, whether through increasing the length of
the property right or the scope of the property right, can actually impair
the economic goals that underlie the intellectual property laws.

